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ABSTRACT: As per the conventional wisdom there should be provision for public 
assistance for skills acquirement for improving relative wage inequality in the future. 
This paper attempts to explore the validity of this traditional perception with the help of a 
two-sector, specific factor general equilibrium model with endogenous skills formation 
and provision for public subsidy aimed to encourage acquisition of skills on the part of 
unskilled labour. The analysis questions the desirability of the policy on the ground that it 
may not only aggravate inequality in the current period but also does not necessarily 
improve the wage disparity at a future date. 
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Does Public Assistance for Skills Formation Necessarily Improve Wage 
Inequality in the Future? 
 
1.  Introduction and motivation 
 
The aspect of skills formation is extremely crucial in all countries irrespective of whether 
developed or developing.1 It promotes human capital formation which is conducive to 
economic growth and prosperity of an economy as well as has an egalitarian effect 
because it is likely to lower the difference in wages between the two groups of worker 
differentiated with respect to their skills. The conventional wisdom is that skills 
acquisition, given the size of the workforce, lowers the endowment of unskilled labour in 
the short run and raises the supply of skilled labour in the future. In the current period, 
relative wages should move in favour of unskilled labour as the supply of this type of 
labour decreases although the endowment of skilled labour does not change. In future 
unskilled workers going for skill acquisition in period 1 become skilled and therefore, the 
endowment of skilled labour goes up while that of unskilled labour does not change. The 
wage inequality again improves because of increased supply of skilled labour. If these 
arguments are valid then logically it follows that there should be provision for public 
assistance for skill acquirement. In the post-reform regime, the need for this type of 
public assistance has become extremely critical in view of the empirical evidences of 
strong symmetrical wage movements against unskilled labour in different countries 
across the globe.2 , 3  
                                                 
1
 Different facets of skills formation have been discussed in works like Autor (2014), Becker 
(1964), Brown et al. (2001), Crouch et al. (1999), Heckman and Krueger (2003), and Vanhuysse 
(2007).  
 
2
 See for example, Harrison and Hanson (1999), Curie and Harrison (1997), Robbins (1995), 
Beyer et al. (1999), Feenstra and Hanson (1997), Wood (1997) and Khan (1998).  
  
3
 In this connection, it is important to mention that Beyer et al.(1999), while studying the 
consequence of trade liberalization on wages in Chile, have found that an increase in the 
proportion of labour force with higher education exerted downward pressure to reduce the 
skilled-unskilled wage inequality. Therefore, as per their findings education had some equalizing 
 3
This paper purports to examine the validity of this conventional wisdom in terms of a two 
sector-three factor general equilibrium model with endogenous skill formation and 
provision for public subsidy designed at encouraging acquisition of expertise on the part 
of the workers.4 It is a two-period model where the number of people going for skills 
acquisition and hence the supply of unskilled labour in period 1 is endogenously 
determined from the intertemporal utility maximization exercise of the unskilled working 
families where the population size including skilled and unskilled workers remains the 
same over time. The question of skills acquisition on the part of skilled workers does not 
arise. Each unskilled working family in its maximization exercise takes the wage rates as 
datum. Although both the wages in period 2 change the family cannot foresee them as 
their decision for skills formation is taken in period 1. In the given circumstances, the 
consequences of the public subsidy provided in period 1 on the relative wage inequality 
in both the periods are examined. We find that the subsidy aggravates the inequality in 
the current period if the high-skill sector is capital-intensive and that the policy does not 
necessarily improve the inequality in the future period.5 These results can at least 
question the desirability of public assistance for skills formation especially when it may 
fail to ensure the desired effect on wage inequality in future even though it may aggravate 
income inequality among the working class at present.   
 
                                                                                                                                                 
effects on the wage gap in that country which fortifies the necessity of providing public 
incentives to skills acquisition. 
 
4
 We have basically incorporated endogenous skills formation in an otherwise Jones’ (1971) 
model. 
 
5
 That the difference in distributive shares of capital between high-skill and low-skill sectors play 
a crucial role in determining the final outcome on the relative wage inequality resulting from any 
exogenous shock has been pointed out in many theoretical works like Chaudhuri (2004), Marjit 
and Kar (2005), Chaudhuri and Yabuuchi (2007), Beladi et al. (2008) and Chaudhuri (2008). 
However, Chaudhuri (2008) has found a special case where these distributive shares do not 
matter. Although there are a couple of papers in the literature like Kar and Beladi (2004) and 
Yabuuchi and Chaudhuri (2009) that have introduced skills formation in terms of a separate 
education sector in a static general equilibrium framework and have studied its impact on the 
relative wage inequality we do not come across any theoretical work that has analyzed the 
consequence of  the skills-promoting subsidy policy in a dynamic set-up with endogenous skills 
formation and has simultaneously demonstrated the possibility of its failure in improving wage 
inequality in both present and future periods. 
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2. The Model and Analysis 
 
We consider a small open economy with two sectors: low-skill (sector 1) and high-skill 
(sector 2). Sector 1 produces the export commodity ( 1X ) with the help of unskilled 
labour ( L ) and capital ( K ) while sector 2 produces the import good ( 2X ) by means of 
skilled labour ( S ) and capital. Markets are competitive and all the standard assumptions 
including CRS hold. While capital is perfectly mobile intersectorally unskilled labour and 
skilled labour are specific to sectors 1 and 2, respectively. The endowments of both 
skilled labour and capital are given exogenously while the aggregate supply of unskilled 
labour in the economy is endogenously determined. Commodity prices, iP s are given by 
the small open economy assumption. Finally, commodity 1 is taken to be the numeraire.  
 
The economy is endowed with L number of unskilled families each possessing 1 unit of 
labour. The supply of unskilled labour by each family is endogenously determined from 
its intertemporal utility maximizing behavior in period 1. LetW and SW denote the existing 
unskilled and skilled wages, respectively. As SW W>  in period 1, a fraction of family 
labour, Sl  goes for skills formation while the rest, (1 Sl− ) works in the unskilled labour 
market at the wage,W . The family receives a government assistance (subsidy) designed 
at encouraging skill formation at the rate, s for the part of family labour that goes for skill 
formation. There are no direct costs of acquiring skills.6 The family consumes its entire 
income in each period. Hence, the question of savings or borrowing at the time of their 
decision-making (period 1) does not arise. The indirect (opportunity) cost of skills 
formation is (W s− ). The endogenously determined aggregate supply function of 
unskilled labour in the economy in general form is given as follows.7  
                                                 
6
 One can introduce direct costs of acquiring skills which would not affect the basic results of the 
paper. For further details see the concluding section. 
 
7
 It has been derived in Appendix 1. 
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respectively, 
denote the elasticities of (.)L with respect to , SW W and s , respectively. We present the 
properties of the (.)L function in terms of the following proposition.8 
Proposition 1: The aggregate supply of unskilled labour in the economy is an increasing 
function of unskilled wage and decreasing in both skilled wage and rate of subsidy on 
skills formation provided in period 1.    
 
The reasons for the signs of the partial derivatives are obvious. An increase (a decrease) 
in unskilled wage,W (rate of subsidy, s ) raises the opportunity cost of acquiring 
skills,(W s− ) and hence leads to higher supply of unskilled labour by each family and 
vice versa. On the other hand, an increase in skilled wage, SW raises the present 
discounted return from skills formation which in turn lowers the supply unskilled labour. 
Note that the number of unskilled working families, L is exogenously given and does not 
change over time.      
 
The general equilibrium structure of the model consists of the following set of equations. 
11 1Wa raL K+ =
         (2)  
2 2 2W a ra PS S K+ =
         
(3)                                                                                       
( ), ,1 1a X L W W sL S=
        (4)                                      
2 2a X SS =
          
(5)                                              
1 1 2 2a X a X KK K+ =          (6)       
                                                 
8
 This result holds in period 2 as well. See proposition 4. 
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where a ji denotes the per unit requirement of the j th input in the i th sector with  
, ,j L S K= and 1,2i =  while r  is the return to capital. Besides, we define ( )j jiji
i
w a
P
θ = as the 
distributive share of the j th input in the i th sector which would be used subsequently in 
stating the results.     
 
Equations (2) and (3) are the two zero-profit conditions for the low-skill and high-skill 
sectors, respectively. Equations (4) – (6) are the full-employment conditions for unskilled 
labour, skilled labour and capital. 
 
Using equations (7) and (8), equation (9) can be rewritten as follows. 
( )1 2, ,
1 2
a aK KL W W s S KSa aL S
+ =
       (6.1) 
This is an indecomposable production system. Factor prices, ,W WS and r are determined 
simultaneously from equations (2), (3) and (6.1) as functions of the system parameters 
including s . Then 1X and 2X are obtained from equations (4) and (5), respectively as a ji s are 
now known.    
 
As W WS > , the absolute wage gap is ( SW W− ) and the relative wage inequality is given by 
ˆ ˆ( )W WS − where Here ‘ ∧ ’ implies proportional change e.g. ˆ ( )
S
S
S
dWW
W
= . The 
skilled−unskilled wage gap improves (worsens) in absolute terms if the gap between SW  and 
W  falls (rises). On the other hand, the wage inequality improves (deteriorates) both in 
absolute and relative terms if ˆ ˆ( ) ( )0.SW W− < >  
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3.  Results 
 
Differentiating equations (1) – (3) and (6.1), using (1) and simplifying the following two 
propositions can be ascertained. 
Proposition 2: An increase in the subsidy designed to encourage skills formation lowers the 
supply of unskilled labour in the economy if 1 2
1 2
( )
S
W L K
K SW
E
E
θ θ
θ θ
≥ .9 
Proposition 3: The relative wage inequality worsens (in period 1) due to the subsidy policy 
if 1 2
1 2
( ) 1.
S
W L K
K SW
E
E
θ θ
θ θ
≥ >  On the contrary, it improves if 1 2
1 2
( ) 1.
S
W L K
K SW
E
E
θ θ
θ θ
≥ <   
 
Propositions 2 and 3 can intuitively be explained in the following fashion. If the subsidy 
rate, s  increases there would be a direct negative effect on (.)L . As the supply of unskilled 
labour initially falls, the unskilled wage,W rises and the low-skill sector (sector 1) contracts 
releasing capital to the high-skill sector (sector 2). Consequently, sector 2 expands and 
demands more skilled labour that raises the skilled wage, SW . So, both W and SW increase 
which produce two opposite induced (indirect) effects on (.)L . The supply of unskilled labour 
rises as W rises while it falls as SW increases. Therefore, there are three different effects 
on (.)L . Our analysis shows that the sum of the two negative effects dominates over the 
positive effect of an increase in W  and the net effect would be a fall in the aggregate supply 
of unskilled labour in the economy under the sufficient condition that 1 2
1 2
( )
S
W L K
K SW
E
E
θ θ
θ θ
≥ .       
We have already noted that bothW and SW have increased and sector 1 (sector 2) has 
contracted (expanded). The contracting sector 1 releases capital to sector 2. However, as in 
our model capital is fully utilized, the released capital by sector 1 would be absorbed by 
sector 2 only if its rate of return, r  falls. Thus, r plummets which is also clear from the two 
                                                 
9
 This result also holds in period 2. See proposition 4 in this context. 
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zero-profit conditions (equations 2 and 3). The fall in r  leads to saving on capital cost in 
both the sectors. So, the proportions of increase in W and SW depend on the extent of saving 
on capital costs in the two sectors which in turn depends on their distributive shares of 
capital, Kiθ s. If 2 1( )K Kθ θ> < i.e. if 1 2 1 2( )L K K Sθ θ θ θ> < , the saving on capital cost would be 
higher in sector 2 (sector 1) vis-à-vis that in sector 1 (sector 2) and the relative wage 
inequality worsens (improves).           
 
Period 2 
 
We consider the same broad production system in period 2 also. It has already been 
assumed that the aggregate workforce (skilled plus unskilled) i.e. ( L S+ ) does not 
change over time although their composition changes due to skills formation. In period 2 
unskilled labours that went for skills acquisition (and not working in the unskilled labour 
market) in period 1 becomes skilled labour. So, the endowment of skilled labour 
increases from S (in period 1) to ( (.))S S L L= + − (in period 2) while that of unskilled 
labour remains the same, (.)L . As in our indecomposable production structure all factor 
prices depend on factor endowments apart from commodity prices, , SW W and r would 
take different values in equilibrium and so would be the values of jia s, and jiθ s in period 
2. In order to avoid complications in the use of notations we leave them unchanged.  
 
Equations (5) and (6.1) would now have to be replaced by the following. 
2 2Sa X S=                 (5.1) 
( )1 2, ,
1 2
a aK KL W W s S KSa aL S
+ =
            (6.2) 
where, 
( (.))S S L L= + −
 
 
 
Differentiating equations (1) – (3) and (6.2), using (1) and simplifying the following two 
propositions follow. 
 9
Proposition 4: Propositions 1 and 2 continue to hold even in period 2. 
Proposition 5: In period 2 the skilled-unskilled wage inequality improves under all situations 
except when 1 2 1 2L K K Sθ θ θ θ< and the ( )
SW
W
ratio is sufficiently high.                    
 
Although the intuitive explanations of proposition 4 remain the same as before those of the 
remaining one would be somewhat different.10 These are as follows. First, let us see what 
happens to the wage inequality in period 2 resulting from skills formation in period 1. Given 
the rate of skills subsidy, s , (or in the absence of any subsidy) the skilled wage, SW falls as the 
supply of skilled labour, S  rises following the joining of skill-acquired unskilled labour in 
the army of skilled workers in period 2. This raises the return to capital, r (equation (3)) 
which in turn lowers the unskilled wage,W (equation (2)). Hence, in complete contrast to our 
findings in period 1, we here find that both the wages fall. The working class irrespective of 
whether skilled or unskilled becomes worse-off. In each of the two sectors the cost on capital 
has increased. What happens to the relative wage inequality now depends on the difference in 
intersectoral distributive shares of capital i.e. jiθ s. The higher the value of jiθ the higher would 
be the fall in the wage rates. Thus, given the rate of skills acquiring subsidy, s  ( 0≥ ) the 
wage inequality rises due to skills formation if 1 2K Kθ θ> . Let us now consider the situation 
where 0s > and s rises. L falls in both the periods while S rises even further. Sector 1 
contracts while sector 2 expands as unskilled labour and skilled labour are specific to those 
sectors, respectively. Consequently, the expanding sector 2 demands more capital while the 
contracting sector 1 releases capital. If 2 1( ) ( )
2 1
a aK K
a aS L
> , the net effect would be an increase 
in demand for capital that raises its return, r . BothW andWS decrease. 
When ( )1 2 1 2L K K Sθ θ θ θ> < i.e. when ( )2 1K Kθ θ> < the proportionate fall inWS would be 
greater (less) than that inW . Hence the wage inequality improves (worsens). However, if 
                                                 
10
 See verbal explanations provided for propositions 1 and 2.  
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2 1( ) ( )
2 1
a aK K
a aS L
< , the net effect would be a fall in the demand for capital that leads to a 
decrease in r .11 Both the wage rates increase. In this case, the wage inequality improves due 
to the subsidy if 1 2 1 2L K K Sθ θ θ θ< .  
 
3.  Concluding remarks 
 
This theoretical note questions the validity of the conventional wisdom which suggests that 
endogenous skills formation lowers the skilled-unskilled wage inequality in a small open 
economy in both present and future periods and therefore the endeavour on the part of 
unskilled workers for skills acquisition should be encouraged by public subsidy. For 
analytical purpose, we have used a two-sector, specific factor general equilibrium model with 
two types of labour, skilled and unskilled, where unskilled workers have the opportunity to 
go for skills acquisition, become skilled and earn a higher wage in future. The aggregate 
supply of unskilled labour in the economy is determined from the intertemporal utility 
maximizing-behaviour of the unskilled working families in the current period (period 1). The 
unskilled workers after acquiring skills join the army of skilled labour in future thereby 
increase the endowment of skilled labour. The aggregate size of the workforce is assumed to 
remain unchanged over time. A public subsidy designed to promote skills formation lowers 
the supply of unskilled labour in both the periods but raises that of skilled labour in future. 
Our analysis has found that an increase in the public subsidy raises the skilled-unskilled wage 
inequality in the present period if the high-skill sector is capital-intensive (in the Jones-Neary 
                                                 
11
 The net demand for capital falls in period 2 in the case where 1 2 1 2L K K Sθ θ θ θ< if the 
ratio ( 1)SW
W
> is very low and close to unity. But, in the opposite case we always have 
2 1( ) ( )
2 1
a aK K
a aS L
> sinceW WS > . So, the demand for capital cannot fall in this situation. 
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sense) and may accentuate inequality even in period 2 under certain parametric restrictions.12 
In period 1 both the wages increase while the return to capital falls; thereby leading to a 
redistribution of income in favour of the working class although the income inequality may 
become more uneven among the two groups of the working population differentiated 
according to skills. However, in period 2 both the wages fall while the return to capital 
increases except in a special case that leads to a redistribution of income against the working 
class although their inter-group inequality is most likely to diminish. 
 
Finally, it should be pointed out that in this analysis some important issues like labour market 
imperfection especially those of unskilled labour, unemployment problem, efficiency wage 
consideration, and collective bargaining have not been considered. Furthermore, we do not 
take into account savings and direct costs associated with skills acquisition and its financing 
problem. Hence, the role of capital market imperfection has not been taken care of. The 
absence of any non-traded skill-intensive sector like services is also a limitation of the 
analysis. If some of these features are taken into consideration the results of the model may 
hold subject to one or two additional sufficient conditions. However, despite simplicity and 
abstraction the present analysis deserves some attention because it questions the desirability 
of providing public subsidy to assist skills formation from the perspective of improving the 
relative wage inequality in both present and future periods.  
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